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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
FINANCE-LED CAPITALISM
Connecting financialization, private  
equity, and employment outcomes
Ian Clark
Introduction
Observers of comparative political economy have outlined changes in the nature of capitalism 
that have since the late 1970s. It is suggested that full-employment capitalism was replaced 
by a finance-led capitalism centered on neo-liberalism (Harvey, 2007; Crouch, 2011). The 
financial crisis of 2008 reinforced the trajectory of finance-led capitalism and neo-liberalism. 
Central to this change is a process whereby the principles of deregulation and privatization 
were further embedded in the institutional framework of countries such as the UK. Recent con-
tributions to this literature link together economic restructuring, associated neo-liberalism, and 
the emergence of finance-led capitalism. It is suggested that these changes represent a social 
revolution from above, designed to restore the power of capital over labor (Cox & Nilsen, 
2014: 136; Srnicek & Williams, 2015: 52–67).
A literature on financialization (a particular outcome of finance-led capitalism) subsequently 
emerged that asserts capital markets increasingly regulate firm-level behavior. Financializa-
tion involves three processes. First, the ascendency of shareholder value that prioritizes the 
interests of investors at the expense of other firm-level stakeholders (van der Zwan, 2014). 
Second, the emphasis on shareholder value legitimizes a more aggressive management of 
corporate assets to prioritize financial objectives, for example high stock prices and maximiz-
ing the release of cash flows to investors, at the expense of other stakeholders (Thompson, 
2011). Third, it popularizes a range of financial techniques whereby investors extract the 
gains from corporate restructuring and divestment rather than re-investing savings in the 
firm or sharing the gains with other stakeholders. Although these processes are described at 
an abstracted level, the consequences for work and employment at firm level are less clear.
The main arguments developed in this chapter are that the UK played a key role in facil-
itating the transition to finance-led capitalism and financialization, and that the financial 
instruments popularized by private equity (PE) through leveraged buyouts spill over to 
affect the corporate sector more broadly. The chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section provides a theoretical framework which outlines the emergence of finance-led 
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capitalism, the associated diffusion of financialization in the UK economy, and its potential 
effects on labor. The following section outlines the negative implications for work and 
employment as PE instruments enable and encourage investors to appropriate value from 
firms. The final section illustrates the arguments with empirical material drawn from two 
detailed case studies relating to the AA under PE ownership and the collapse of the British 
Homes Stores (BHS) pension scheme.
Full-employment capitalism to finance-led capitalism
From the end of the Second World War until the early 1970s the UK operated within a 
broader Western economic system in which fixed exchange rates facilitated international 
trade in manufactured goods. This system involved Keynesian state intervention to deliver 
sustained economic growth and improved welfare provision (Ruggie, 1982; Harvey, 2007). 
Western economies balanced a commitment to the market economy with intervention to 
promote full employment and social welfare. This capital–labor compromise was designed 
to avoid the economic collapse and associated depression of the 1930s that contributed 
towards the Second World War (Harvey, 2007: 11–12). In the UK, this compromise took 
the form of capital controls, nationalization, a commitment to the welfare state, and trade 
union representation. However, economic growth up until the 1960s obscured long-run rel-
ative economic decline (Gamble, 1988). From the 1970s onwards, neo-liberals proposed to 
reverse economic decline by an alternative policy agenda focused on anti-inflation, balanced 
budgets, reducing union militancy, and curtailing the drag effects on the market of wel-
fare expenditure and state monopolies. The subsequent sterling crisis in 1976 followed by 
increases in industrial action led to successive Conservative governments (1979–1997) that 
focused on financial deregulation and privatization to shift the balance of the economy from 
manufacturing to financial services (Harvey, 2007: 19–30; Crouch, 2011). These changes 
were consistent with the demise of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system which 
underpinned the expansion of export trade between developed nations. Financial markets 
expanded with the beginnings of what became a globally unregulated international financial 
system (Eichengreen, 2008).
By the City “Big Bang” in 1986, the increasing size of the financial sector positioned the 
UK economy center stage in global capitalism. New financial actors such as global asset 
management for hedge funds, PE firms, and sovereign wealth funds dominated the City of 
London (Augar, 2009). The presence of support services for these intermediaries in the City 
and neo-liberal governments removed regulatory obstacles to international capital move-
ments and foreign ownership of UK firms (Harvey, 2007: 62, 70–73; Pendleton & Gospel, 
2014: 88). From the late 1990s, the financialization of the UK economy had involved the 
deregulation of capital markets and legal restrictions on industrial action by the labor force. 
The systematic financialization of UK capitalism required managers to prioritize share-
holder value and downgraded relationships with other stakeholders such as the labor force 
(Lapavitatas, 2013: 15). From the late 1970s, financial market actors have developed and 
diffused innovations to increasingly extract value from firms.
The transition to finance-led capitalism was achieved by financial deregulation and 
international integration which readjusted UK capital into a global form. This reworking 
legitimized the central concern of capital markets, with the market for corporate control 
exerting discipline on managers that did not seek to maximize shareholder value (Münnich, 
2016: 285). The consequences for UK labor included higher job insecurity, increased wage 
inequality, and the dismantling of collective representation. The connection to the labor 
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Political economy of finance-led capitalism
process and the broader political economy of labor is therefore clear. Finance-led capital-
ism and the market for corporate control require a relentless search for investor value that 
ruptures established relations between capital and labor. This has most notably involved 
the decline in wages as a share of national income from 61% in the 1970s to less than 
56% since 1982 (OECD, 2015). The wage share is defined to include wages and non-wage 
benefits such as pensions and national insurance contributions, which represent reproduc-
tion costs for labor. This represents a breach of the post Second World War social contract 
between employers, labor, and the state. New business models aimed to cheapen labor to 
boost short-term profits, through increased labor flexibility (Atkinson, 1984), privatization, 
and management buyouts (Wright et al., 2000, 2002). The “take private” PE business model 
highlighted the extent to which capital was no longer willing to make continuous com-
mitments to labor or even firm ownership. More recently so-called “gig economy” firms 
such as Uber, Deliveroo, and Airbnb that are associated with “platform capitalism” (often 
funded by venture capital and PE) have focused more determinedly on the externalization 
of employment (Srnicek, 2015).
The movement to finance-led capitalism re-purposed the UK state towards restoring 
opportunities for profitable capital investment, notwithstanding low levels of productivity 
in manufacturing and services. Indeed, since the late 1970s, the privatization (often in the 
form of buyouts) of utilities, housing, transport, health, education, and infrastructure were 
key acts by which neo-liberalism pumped profitability back into the private sector (Mason, 
2015: 278). A particular firm level outcome of this transition is that managers are more 
likely to respond to the demands of financial markets than labor markets. Neo-liberalism 
undermines alliances between the state, managerial elites, and organized labor at its heart. 
Restoration of profitability depended on breaking organized labor and a re-commodification 
of labor (Cox & Nilsen, 2014: 141–147). This was achieved by monetary policy which 
allowed unemployment to fluctuate and restricted organized labor and welfare state expend-
iture (Glyn, 2006: 27–31). The following section focuses on the role of PE as an instrument 
of finance-led capitalism.
Private equity: an instrument of finance-led capitalism
The previous section highlighted the role of state policy in the transition to finance-led cap-
italism. Therein structural innovations in capital markets – the market for corporate control 
and a relentless search for investor value – disrupt established relations between capital and 
labor. A disdain for customers, employees, and attachment to locality are hallmarks of a 
globalized approach to business that disconnects circuits of capital and labor (Appelbaum 
et al., 2013). Accordingly, this section briefly defines PE, explains how mega “take private” 
PE funds became a macro instrument of finance-led capitalism under the UK’s New Labour 
government (1997–2010), and then details how the micro instruments of PE challenged 
established workplace employment relations settlements.
Private equity
PE is an asset class that is funded by investors who commit monies to an investment fund for 
a defined numbers of years, usually fewer than ten. Professional fund managers invest these 
monies on behalf of investors in organizations which become portfolio firms either owned 
outright or majority controlled by PE fund partners. So a PE fund is a fund management 
company either in the form of a limited partnership or a plc business that actively manages 
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the pool of money. The limited partnership model is the favored vehicle for two reasons. 
First, a limited partnership has no legal personality yet individual partners can operate col-
lectively. Second, both managing partners in a partnership and limited partners who provide 
the bulk of investment funds are taxed as individuals whereas the partnership itself has no 
liability to taxation. Accordingly, the taxation liability of managing and limited partners, as 
a result of financial engineering, is often reduced to a level less than the taxation levied in 
the UK by booking income as a capital gain, utilizing none-domiciled status, offshoring a 
portfolio firm, or writing off interest against borrowing.
The PE sector is broad in scope and includes venture capital, which is a form of capital 
typically provided by professional institutionally backed outside investors who support the 
growth of new businesses. In addition to venture capital and mid-market PE funds which 
take stakes in an established business to help it roll out nationally, larger, multinational PE 
funds acquire plc firms or divisions of plc firms by buying all the shares or a controlling 
percentage of the shares which are listed on a public stock market such as the London Stock 
Exchange. The purchase of a controlling percentage of the available shares is often the first 
move to complete control, and once a fund has control of all the shares in a portfolio com-
pany then it becomes the single or majority shareholder and the firm is no longer a publicly 
traded plc company; this is what is referred to as the take private, PE business model. So 
venture capital, mid-market funds, and mega-funds which specialize in taking listed firms 
private are different factions of PE capital, but what they do have in common is the manner 
in which funds are raised – on private rather than public markets. But how did the take 
private model deployed by mega-funds come to prominence in the UK?
Private equity under New Labour:  
a macro instrument of finance-led capitalism?
The New Labour government (1997–2010) further rebalanced the economy towards finance-led 
capitalism by promoting the interests of financial capital, in particular hedge funds, PE funds, 
and financial capital asset managers (Augar, 2009). This rebalancing operated in two ways, by 
taxation and fiscal policy. With regard to taxation, New Labour’s 1998 budget exempted busi-
ness assets held initially for ten years from capital gains tax, but then very quickly, business 
assets held for only two years. This exemption was designed to stimulate venture capitalists 
and small business start-ups, but the deregulation was drafted so loosely that it created a tax 
break available to all capital. Hedge funds and PE funds which specialized in buying “asset 
rich” listed firms took advantage of the regulations to fund these acquisitions with massive 
levels of leverage, up to 70% in some cases. After the 1998 budget changes, chargeable gains 
were tapered against the length of time an asset was held with the taper applied to net gains 
that were chargeable after the deduction of any allowances including interest on loans secured 
to buy an asset. This produced the lowest possible charge. Considering business assets held for 
two years, only 25% of the gain would be chargeable creating an effective higher rate taxation 
at 10% (IFS, 2008: 214; Seely, 2010: 3). In benign economic conditions and with rising asset 
values these assets were realized relatively quickly at a massive gain to vicarious investors in 
these funds and the limited partners who put the deals together.
With regard to fiscal policy, from the 1998 budget onwards New Labour’s policy on 
financial regulation legitimized the argument that firms were only accountable to vicarious 
rentier, investor-owners, associated asset managers, and shareholders. This commitment 
secured an alliance with finance and the City that extended over three general election victories 
(Heyes et al., 2014). Hence the financialization of government fiscal policy involved serving 
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Political economy of finance-led capitalism
the interests of venture capital and business, and served the interests of newer more innovative 
factions of financial capital – asset managers, hedge funds, and PE funds. These factions while 
operative and in some cases registered in the UK, are internationalized operations which act in 
the interests of global financial capital.
Theoretically, the development and growth of PE (the take private variant in particular) 
as an instrument of finance-led capitalism lies within the growth of corporate finance as an 
academic discipline and the associated theory of efficient capital markets (Jensen, 2007). 
The theory of efficient capital markets contains an efficient-contracting orientation to the 
firm, that is (capital) markets allocate resources to investments that secure the highest 
returns. The attraction of PE funds, particularly those that specialize in take private buyouts 
is the comparatively high rates of return which averaged between 15% and 20% prior to the 
financial crisis (BVCA, 2008).
These returns led academic supporters and practitioners to argue that PE-backed firms 
secured higher returns for investors and shareholders, had higher productivity, and created 
more jobs than equivalent plc firms, (Bacon et al., 2004, 2008, Bruining et al., 2005; BVCA, 
2008). In many cases the business model did secure the benefits identified in these claims 
and the studies that supported them; however, below the survey method that the majority of 
these studies employed there is far less evaluation of the effects of PE ownership at firm or 
workplace level other than reference to the benefits of active ownership, rapid organizational 
change, and powerful management incentives.
The logic behind PE, like many other business models associated with finance-led 
capitalism, sees a business as a bundle of assets that can be managed on a contractual and 
transactional basis. The ultimate purpose is to generate cash flow and profit streams over 
short-term time horizons by financial and organizational manipulation returning these 
revenue streams to investors. So while PE as a faction of capital claims to be a long-term 
investor, it is the long-term interests of the fund that they refer to not the portfolio firms 
that they control. Rather, portfolio firms are viewed as short-term investments from which 
significant value can be appropriated and redistributed to investors. So in what ways do the 
micro instruments of the take private business model both enable and encourage investors to 
appropriate value from what become portfolio firms?
Micro instruments of PE and the appropriation  
of value from portfolio firms
At firm level the instruments of a PE buyout operate in several ways including share buybacks, 
corporate restructuring, asset sales, and the securitization of firm-level assets, pension scheme 
contribution holidays for employers, and contractual approaches to managing a company 
pension scheme. Each instrument detaches from firm-level performance and the development 
of core operational capability in a business. The application of these instruments represents 
a strategic choice for a new owner to either appropriate value from a business and return it to 
investors and new owners in interim dividends and payments, or invest money in developing 
the business (House of Commons, 2016: 6). Share buybacks for example are designed to 
reduce the pool of shareholders, raise the price of shares, and facilitate the return of monies 
to investors and are often deployed just prior to a firm being taken private. Securitization may 
also enable corporate restructuring by divesting firm-level assets and then managing them 
through contractual rather than in-firm relational methods. Securitization and associated 
lease back arrangements take value bearing but less liquid assets such as buildings, equip-
ment, transport fleets, and sometimes pension schemes and through financial engineering 
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transpose assets into a security. For example, a mortgage-backed security is secured by a 
collection of mortgages or ownership rights to premises or vehicles. Cash flows are generated 
as financial institutions and non-financial firms use securitization to immediately realize the 
value of a revenue-generating asset such as buy-to-let mortgages or the value of investments 
and payments which fund a defined benefit pension scheme. These instruments are frequently 
used by non-financial firms too, which illustrates the diffusion of particular techniques and 
instruments associated with finance-led capitalism into the non-financial economy.
In the case of defined benefit pension schemes securitization is further complicated by 
the availability of insurance company buyouts of pension schemes. Specialist pension man-
agement firms buy up final salary pension schemes usually on the proviso that they are sold 
to them “closed” to new members and some current members. However, in some cases such 
as the buyout of BHS and then the secondary sale of BHS to Retail Acquisitions, it can prove 
difficult to secure a pension scheme sale (House of Commons, 2016: 20). It may be the case 
that following an employer pension scheme payment holiday instigated by a new PE-backed 
owner that the scheme is in substantial deficit and by association that the Pensions Regula-
tor will not allow a sale to proceed (House of Commons, 2016: 14–19). The implications 
of a business failure for the workforce are dramatic and as the cases at Comet Electrical 
stores, Jessops the camera retailer, and MG Rover previously demonstrated, resulted in sig-
nificant write-downs in the value of pension contributions for the workforces and those 
already retired (Bailey et al., 2010). More significantly the liability for pension protection 
in cases of a business in administration is transferred to the pension protection fund. This 
is a fund levied on all final salary pension funds, many of which are significantly smaller 
than those in these larger funds which were written down as a result of the application of 
unsustainable business models. It is true that all forms of firm can enter administration, but 
as the recent Work and Pensions Department inquiry into the collapse of the BHS fund con-
cluded, in some cases of acquisition by PE-supported investors, pension payment holidays 
are one method by which such investors strategize “taking money out of a business” and 
redistributing it to investors (House of Commons, 2016: 55–56).
As an instrument of PE acquisitions employer pension contribution payment holidays 
enable financialized business models to “mine” firm-level assets. Often expressed in the 
term “recapitalizations”, the monies previously allocated to employer pension scheme con-
tributions are instead returned to investors. Consideration of recapitalizations which divert 
employer pension payments is important because pension payments represent reproduction 
costs for labor which many new investor-owner models that are emblematic of finance-led 
capitalism seek to minimize if not avoid.
Some instruments that are designed to appropriate value under PE ownership, such 
as corporate restructuring and associated dividend and debt recapitalizations, operate 
within approaches to corporate governance developed under finance-led capitalism. These 
approaches work in the specific interest of capital and seek to minimize liability to taxation 
and transparency by delisting firms (“taking them private”) and in the use of offshore reg-
istration for now private firms. Private firms and those which are offshored are not subject 
to the same transparency requirements or related codes of conduct as publicly listed firms. 
Indeed it is often the case that the stated purpose of taking a firm private is to reduce both 
transparency requirements and liability to taxation in the country where it was previously 
listed. Alliance Boots, for example, is no longer a UK firm; it was bought in 2007 in a deal 
fronted by KKR PE which led six other PE investors where the firm was re-domiciled as a 
private Swiss company substantially reducing its liability to taxation. In 2012 Walgreens, 
the US drug store retailer, bought 45% of the business and in 2014 confirmed its option 
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Political economy of finance-led capitalism
to acquire the rest of the business in 2015; hence Alliance Boots is now a UK-based, 
Swiss-registered, US-owned multinational firm.
The logic of going private and offshoring is further reinforced if a firm-level final salary 
pension scheme is in deficit as a result of employer payment holidays or where the deficit 
is so large that it potentially undermines the business as a going concern. As the next sec-
tion of the chapter illustrates, detailed case study evidence strongly suggests that a central 
reason for deficits in the era of finance-led capitalism is that monies allocated for employer 
pension fund contributions are frequently diverted to pay down debt or are paid to owner 
investors as dividend recapitalizations. At firm level these claims flow towards investors 
who position themselves as new claimants to value, both its appropriation from the labor 
process and its extraction from contracts which new owners choose to default on (Lazonick 
& Mazzucato, 2013: 1096). The appropriation of value by PE owners which have taken a 
firm private may be enacted directly by investor activism, leveraged buyouts, and associated 
restructures which lead to intensification of the labor process (Clark, 2011, 2016). It is the 
case too that these instruments can operate retrospectively, as managers acting on behalf of 
capital appropriate, sell, or take contribution holidays from restructured pension schemes – 
the previously earned-deferred income of labor (Grady, 2013).
Redundancy
A clear-cut instrument designed to appropriate value for PE investors is the use of redundancy. 
Again critics of the argument developed in this chapter will argue that all firms involved in 
merger and acquisition undertake some consolidation; clearly that is true but PE-backed 
acquisitions have specific advantages over listed businesses and listed business acquisitions. 
At the height of the take private boom in 2007 many PE firms denied that they were in fact 
an employer but that instead they represented many smaller scale investor-owners who were 
in fact the real owners of a business. The Treasury Select Committee, which investigated the 
PE sector in 2007–2008, held that such arguments were disingenuous (House of Commons 
Library, 2008). It is, however, the case that PE acquisitions which remain a publicly listed 
firm or those taken private are classed as a change of majority shareholder not a transfer of 
undertaking protected by the UK’s TUPE – transfer of undertaking protection of employ-
ment regulations. This enables PE investors to disregard agreements unilaterally formulated 
by previous owners or those negotiated between a recognized trade union and an employer 
in collective bargaining. This derogation from the legislation allows PE owners to lawfully 
deny some “employer responsibilities” in respect of information and consultation prior to 
acquisition and deny and de-recognize any existing collective bargaining agreements more 
easily than traditional employers. In cases where a portfolio firm does not have a recognized 
trade union and therefore no collective bargaining arrangements, these changes can amount 
to unilateral employer action. While unilateral changes to pay rates, holiday entitlement, 
and pension provision represent serious breaches of contract, those affected by them may be 
asked to agree to such changes or find their job subject to potential redundancy. This leaves 
many workers subject to unilateral changes with no option but to accept them or accept them 
but seek to minimize the effects of any unilateral change.
The AA and BHS under private equity
At the start of this chapter it was argued that finance-led capitalism and its associated 
motives and instruments in PE required state sponsorship to enable the transition to financial 
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capitalism. Deregulation of financial services abolished established rules covering specific 
privately owned exchanges and financial enterprises. As the previous sction explained, in 
the case of incentives for PE, these rules were replaced by capital-friendly government 
regulations. The employment implications will now be outlined in two case studies. 
Developments at the AA highlight the direct impact of PE buyouts on employment. A 
further important impact of financialization is the spillover of the instruments developed 
in PE buyouts that affect labor in the broader corporate sector. This impact is explained by 
considering the pension scheme at BHS.
Private equity at the AA
The AA was formed in 1905 following a meeting of motoring enthusiasts who were 
concerned about the deployment of speed traps by the police. The group operated as a cam-
paigning pressure group on road safety and road signs. After the Second World War, the 
AA campaigned against the continuation of petrol rationing and in 1949 it introduced a 
breakdown and recovery service. Insurance services were rolled out and in the early 1970s 
AA “roadwatch” began reporting details of traffic congestion and roadworks on commercial 
radio stations. In 1973 the AA introduced AA Relay, a service which undertook to transport 
all occupants of any covered vehicle to any destination in the UK in the event that a vehicle 
could not be repaired or restarted at the road side. By the mid 1990s the AA had over 8 
million members and was ranked first in the Which surveys of roadside assistance providers. 
The AA website claimed that in 2007 the group had 15 million members. In 1999 AA mem-
bers voted to de-mutualize the company and AA managers sold the company to Centrica, the 
holding company owners of British Gas for £1.1 billion, gifting each fully paid up member 
of the breakdown service a £100 payment. In 2004 Centrica sold the AA to two PE firms 
CVC and Permira for £1.75 billion. In 2007 the AA merged with the Saga group, which was 
owned by a third PE group Charterhouse. A new holding company, Acromos Holdings, was 
created which was owned by CVC, Permira, Charterhouse, and Charterhouse staff. The deal 
secured £3.35 billion for the AA and at the time valued the combined group at £6 billion, 
placing it as the 20th biggest company in the UK.
Union recognition at the AA
The GMB trade union held sole recognition rights at the AA. The union had a substantive 
agreement with the AA over collective bargaining for pay and working time and a proce-
dural agreement over job security and redundancy, termed a “job security and business 
development agreement”. The latter included a collective agreement on redeployment and 
severance terms, which in turn was incorporated into individual contracts of employment. 
In comparison to statutory terms the details of this agreement were well developed; for 
example, AA staff liable to redundancy were subject to a four-month notice period and 
within this in the first instance, if staffing levels had to be reduced, volunteers were sought to 
avoid the need for compulsory redundancies. Moreover, all staff subject to redundancy were 
offered alternative employment opportunities which, if on a lower pay rate, were protected 
by pay red circling. Lastly, statutory severance payments for voluntary or compulsory redun-
dancies were supplemented in the AA-GMB agreement by an additional one month’s salary 
for each year of service up to a maximum of 25 months. Redundant staff were able to leave 
the AA with full entitlement to severance pay immediately on notification. The agreement 
was signed by the AA group managing director and the group personnel director, the GMB 
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Political economy of finance-led capitalism
national chairman, and the GMB national secretary and covered all AA staff in post before 
January 1, 1996 and remained operational until the AA was acquired by Permira. In 2004 
the GMB’s membership density stood at 70%.
Union recognition under PE
The GMB was de-recognized by the AA in 2005, and the union was denied all access 
to the workplace, and check-off arrangements for collection of union subscriptions was 
terminated. The GMB senior organizer stated that GMB members were told that a new 
section of the GMB was in consultation with the AA. From February 2005 the applicability 
of all GMB AA substantive and procedural agreements came to an end. The staff asso-
ciation was in fact the AA Democratic Union (AADU), which changed its name to the 
Independent Democratic Union (IDU) in October 2007. The IDU is registered with the 
certification officer as an independent trade union under the Trade Union and Labor Rela-
tions (Consolidation) Act, 1992. Since 2005, the IDU is the only union recognized for the 
purpose of collective bargaining at the AA, and its rule book is only available by written 
request of members and is not available in any form on the IDU website (www.idu.org.uk). 
In March 2007 the IDU General Secretary claimed to have more union members at the AA 
than the GMB (1,500) which still claimed to have 2,300 members, many of whom it was still 
acting for either as employees or former employees in unfair dismissal cases (www.gmb.
aa.org.uk). In April 2007 the IDU claimed 70% union membership across the AA, when the 
AA’s Human Resources director declared the company to be satisfied with relations with the 
IDU in the context of negotiating and agreeing a 4.5% pay award (Berry, 2007).
Even though the IDU has a certificate of independence, the GMB national organizer 
maintained that it was and remains a “scab” organization which was founded by a disgruntled 
GMB official (who is now the IDU General Secretary) in collusion with AA management 
and their PE owners. The evidence suggests that the AA’s PE owners wanted to de-recognize 
the GMB union and that they had the assistance and capability of local staff to enable them 
to do so (Clark, 2011, 2016). Recognition of the AADU/IDU aligned PE owner interests 
with those of the workforce by enabling management, on behalf of PE owners, to downgrade 
the financial scale and scope of substantive and procedural agreements. By retaining col-
lective bargaining integrity to these agreements AA management and their PE owners were 
able to claim the GMB de-recognition and the recognition of the IDU was an inter-union 
dispute and nothing to do with them.
Impact on AA employees
Within a month of recognizing the AADU in 2005 the AA PE owners commenced a restruc-
ture by initiating a performance management program via letters sent to all patrol staff 
informing them that they would be placed in one of two categories: those meeting or exceed-
ing expectation and those whose performance does not meet expectations. Patrol staff who 
met expectations were awarded a £2,000 bonus. Those who did not were called to one-to-one 
roadside meetings without representation from the AADU or the GMB and offered £18,000 
to leave the AA or accept placement on an improvement program which would lead to sum-
mary dismissal if they did not accept this change to their terms and conditions to which the 
AADU had agreed (GMB archive 1).
Through this process 3,400 patrol workers (50% of the patrol force) left the firm. These 
departures were not redundancies but voluntary resignations recorded on an AA RSS Patrol 
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decision form. In the decision box AA employees are given two options: either “I wish to 
accept a mutual termination of my employment” or “I wish to continue my employment with 
the AA as an RSS patrol” (GMB archive 2). In addition, these resignations were covered by 
an “authority to advise on compromise agreements” (GMB archive 3).
I hereby authorize xxxxxxxx xxxxxxx to advise me regarding the compromise 
agreement between myself and the AA. I understand the rules of the union 
representation/advice in connection with this compromise agreement is given by 
the AADU national secretary or representative nominated by the AADU national 
secretary on condition that 1, I will remain a member of the AADU and continue 
to pay the normal contribution rate while the proceedings continue and 2, I will 
cooperate fully with the representative nominated by the AADU, act upon their 
advice and provide as far as possible, all relevant information. I understand that if I 
fail to comply with conditions or wilfully provide false information to the union or 
my representative, representation may be withdrawn by the AADU.
The £18,000 exit award was far lower than those previously agreed between the 
now de-recognized GMB union and the AA, which on average could see a patrol 
worker retire or take voluntary redundancy with a payment of around £30,000 and 
in some cases up to £50,000 for long serving workers. The firm also intensified 
working by the introduction of the “last job of shift” which could significantly 
lengthen a worker’s shift. “Last jobs” could be called within the final 30 minutes 
of an 8-hour shift, which could potentially lengthen working time by as much as a 
further 5 hours. Third, the firm introduced 195 annual “standby hours”, which in 
effect equated to unpaid overtime. These individual developments were recently 
rolled up into new contracts which cut core earnings but inserted incentives for 
jobs completed to compensate for last job of shift and stand-by hours and further 
incentives for sales commissions, for example on membership upgrades.
While remaining de-recognized in 2016, the GMB retains over 800 members in the AA’s 
current workforce of 4,000, giving it a density of 20%. The majority of these members work 
in the patrol service where 2,300 workers are currently employed. Although the GMB’s aim 
is to secure re-recognition, this may prove hard to secure other than if patrol workers are 
taken as an initial bargaining unit, which would give the GMB an approximate density of 
30%. The GMB has scored regular successes in employment tribunal cases where the union 
represented AA workers as individuals and has now secured the right under the Employment 
Relations Act 1999 for GMB shop stewards to represent union members on individual issues 
which the AA previously denied them. The AA agreed that its position that AA workers 
could not be accompanied by a certified GMB representative did not reflect the procedural 
position laid out in legislation.
The financialization of the AA
In 2014 the AA and Saga were de-merged with both firms re-listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The cost of the de-merger and all associated flotation costs were placed on the AA 
balance sheet (Automobile Association, 2013). This marked the acceleration of financialization 
at firm level. The ownership structure employed by the AA PE owners – the limited partnership – 
enabled them to become the firm’s new investor-owners via a change of majority shareholder 
and continue to run the firm as it was before they acquired it. This allowed the new owner to 
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place any costs associated with its acquisition of the firm and any further costs associated 
with any restructure on the balance sheet of the business. Debts associated with leverage 
and any loans or dividend payments to themselves, consultancy fees, and accumulated debt 
interest can be charged to the portfolio firm (the AA), which Acromas Holdings owned. 
That is, the AA was mined for returns to investors and shareholders and then charged for 
the direct and indirect costs of this appropriation of value. The original purchase by PE part-
nerships CVC and Permira was highly leveraged with loans of £1.3 billion or 75% of the 
£1.75 billion purchase price secured against the AA’s assets. The following year the owners 
increased their loans by a further £1 billion, 50% of which they appropriated as an interim 
payment. Two years later in 2007 Acromas Holdings funded the merger of the AA and Saga 
via a refinancing deal which resulted in £4.8 billion of debt on the AA/Saga balance sheet. 
Some £3 pounds was used to buy back existing debt at the AA and Saga while the remainder 
of the debt was used to make a further interim payment to management and PE investors in 
Acromas. The 2014 de-merger was refinanced with a further £3 billion loan secured against 
the AA’s assets and future revenue streams. A management team at the AA bought 70% of 
the firm with backing from 10 City fund managers for approximately £1 billion to fund an 
accelerated stock market listing valued at £1.4 billion.
At the time of its stock market listing the accumulated debt on the AA’s balance sheet 
was roughly twice the value of its listing valuation. In March 2015 the AA announced plans 
to raise a further £1 billion to help improve its finances and repay “PIK” (payment in kind) 
notes in an effort to reduce annual financing interest costs of £195 million. In June 2015 
the AA’s market capitalization value was £2.32 billion. Since flotation the AA has been 
headed by a new chief executive, who previously headed a rival car recovery service, Green 
Flag, a business run on a franchise model. Interviews with the GMB national organizer, 
senior southern region organizer, and regional organizers suggest that this model may be 
one that the new management team may seek to diffuse at the AA, that is, retreat from an 
employment-based model to one of self-employment.
The collapse of BHS
The acquisition of BHS by Sir Phillip Green and the Taveta Investment Group followed by 
its sale to Retail Acquisitions illustrates the regulatory weaknesses in the UK’s finance-led 
capitalism. In particular the BHS case highlights permissive governance in private invest-
ment vehicles modelled on the take private, PE business model and its associated acquisition 
methods and practices. These arrangements have significant implications for the regulation 
of defined benefit pension schemes. The retailer was bought by Sir Phillip Green for £200 
million in May 2000 and was immediately sold to Taveta Number Two Investments for the 
same amount of money in a deal which was 100% leveraged over eight years, that is Taveta 
put no money into the deal. The BHS group paid £423 million in dividends and lease back 
deals for property in the period until 2004, £307 million of which went directly to the Green 
family (House of Commons, 2016: 5). However, by 2014 BHS was in a financially precar-
ious position and was effectively kept in business by loans from the Green family totaling 
£250 million. Sir Phillip Green made a strategic choice to appropriate considerable value 
from BHS in its earlier profitable years and made no attempt to increase investment in the 
firm to sustain its competitive edge. More specifically Taveta Number Two Investment was a 
100% leveraged offshore investment vehicle. To reduce taxation and transparency liability, 
it combined with another offshore firm, Carmen, owned by the Green family, which too 
reduced taxation liabilities on its revenues from leases on BHS properties.
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At the same time as extracting and appropriating value from BHS, via the application of 
instruments pioneered in PE, under Sir Phillip Green’s leadership the firm declined to make 
the necessary employer pension contributions to retain the sustainability of the pension fund. 
By 2009 the deficit on the two BHS pension schemes was £166 million, whereas in 2000 
when the firm was acquired the two schemes had a surplus of £43 million. It is clear from 
the deliberations of the DWP inquiry into the collapse of the BHS pension schemes that Sir 
Phillip Green sought to avoid these payments. Moreover, some of the monies which should 
have gone into the pension schemes went into dividend payments, management charges, sale 
and leaseback payments and associated charges, inter-firm loans, and use of BHS shares 
as collateral for loans to fund company purchases. The Pensions Regulator asked for this 
material to be provided but BHS declined to do so (House of Commons, 2016: 16). The 
pension scheme deficit prevented the sale of the firm to an appropriate and credible buyer; 
for example, Sports Direct declined to buy the firm for precisely these reasons.
By 2012 the BHS pension scheme deficit was £233 million and Sir Phillip Green began 
seeking a buyer for the business. After several abortive attempts including the one with 
Sports Direct in 2015, BHS was sold to Retail Acquisitions for £1. The firm was sold as a 
going concern that had financial support from the Taveta Investment Group and, according 
to the BHS 2013–2014 annual report, was capable of trading without threat of liquidation 
for 12 months (BHS, 2013, 2014). To establish credibility Retail Acquisitions had to provide 
£35 million of equity to BHS and secure working capital from Farallon, a US-based PE and 
investment firm. On the basis that Retail Acquisitions had both the equity and the working 
capital, the deal went ahead; however, the purchaser had neither. The £35 million was sup-
posed to come from the sale of the BHS headquarters building in Marylebone but failed to 
transpire. In contrast Farallon Capital issued only a non-binding term-sheet offer to Retail 
Acquisitions which set out the details of a possible loan which was subject to satisfactory 
resolution of BHS pension liabilities with The Pensions Regulator. The funding was in fact 
three £40 million loans, each of which was payable after the repayment of the previous loan. 
The only working capital that Retail Acquisitions was able to secure was a £25 million loan 
facility from Sir Phillip Green. Despite this, Retail Acquisitions appropriated £7 million on 
its first day of ownership to pay advisors, its board, associated salary costs, and transaction 
management fees. Moreover, Retail Acquisitions removed all profitable assets from BHS 
and placed them under its ownership and appropriated £11 million in fees and salary costs 
in its 13-month ownership of BHS. Retail Acquisitions assumed full responsibility for the 
BHS pension scheme deficit but made no payments into the scheme, and by April 2015 
when BHS was wound up by HMRC the deficit stood at £345 million. The 20,000 current 
and former BHS employees faced an uncertain future as the pension scheme liabilities were 
passed to the pension protection scheme, which proposed write downs on pension payouts 
of up to 31% where the average across the BHS schemes was 25%. However, in May 2016, 
Sir Phillip Green agreed to pay £363m to insolvent BHS pension funds, and the proposal 
is that staff get on average 80% of full benefits. The 9,000 scheme members with pension 
pots of less than £18,000 will be offered cash settlements and the other 10,000 members 
will receive top-ups (of between 80–88% of original entitlements) in a new scheme. In the 
end Green decided to offer these payments because of the reputational damage associated 
with the inappropriate use of pension payment holidays – diverting monies to investors and 
owners. At the time when these payments were made, it remained lawful to sell a firm as a 
going concern despite The Pensions Regulator having moral hazard concerns on any pro-
posed restructure. That is, Green knew The Pensions Regulator would discover what came 
out in the DWP inquiry but sought to sell out to Retail Acquisitions to legally absolve his 
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investment vehicles of any legal responsibility. Accordingly, in this voluntary arrangement 
scheme, members will still lose at least 12% of their deferred income.
Conclusions
As many contributions in this volume illustrate, management buyouts are often very 
successful and lead to innovative sustainable businesses where owners, managers, and 
employees all share in financial returns. There are though cases where the very success 
of the take private business model and the deregulation which surrounds it has significant 
firm-level distributional consequences. The two cases examined here are not necessarily 
typical of all PE buyouts. However, each illustrates that the state acting in capital’s interest 
has created conditions whereby both finance-led capitalism and financialization extract 
value from firms at labor’s expense. It is within the current framework of finance-led cap-
italism that the instruments of PE and management buyouts operate. The cases do present 
worst cases scenarios of how deregulation in the UK context can lead to deteriorating 
employment relations settlements for labor following on from buyouts. Indeed the AA 
case in particular and the trade union media campaign which surrounded it led directly to 
a Treasury Select Committee examination into the sector. Moreover, the publicity which 
surround the AA buyout and the Parliamentary investigation into the sector resulted in 
many PE-backed owners and managers moderating their previously aggressive behavior 
towards labor and agreeing to work with trade unions in a process of managed change. 
The BHS case illustrates the diffusion of micro instruments associated with PE into 
non-financial firms. It also illustrates the scope of deregulation when a firm in financial 
distress is potentially supported by PE investors in a secondary sale. The argument demon-
strates how state-facilitated finance-led capitalism enables the priorities, motives, and 
instruments of financialization to assert the interests of capital over labor. PE investors, in 
particular larger so-called mega-funds, which often launch buyouts for listed firms, became 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries a key instrument in finance-led capital-
ism actively supported by the state.
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